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Abstract 
Recently it has been suggested that low fertility countries may be caught in a trap that is 
hard to get out of. One important mechanism in such a trap would be social interaction 
and its effect on the ideal family size. Such social interaction mechanisms are hard to 
capture in formal models, therefore we use an agent-based simulation model to 
investigate the issue. In our experimental setup a stable growth and population path is 
calibrated to Swedish data and using the Swedish social policy setup. The model is 
provoked into a fertility trap by increasing relative child costs linked to positive growth. 
Even rather large increases in child benefits are then insufficient to get out of the trap. 
However, the small number of children temporarily enables the economy to grow faster 
for several decades. Removing the adaptation of social norms turns out to disarm the 
trap. 
 
 
Keywords: Low fertility trap, Social norms, Relative income, Economic growth 
 
Basse fécondité et croissance à long terme dans une économie à secteur public très 
développé 
 
Il a été suggéré récemment que les pays à basse fécondité pourraient être victimes d’un 
piège dont ils auraient du mal à se dégager. Un mécanisme essentiel dans ce piège serait 
l’interaction sociale et son effet sur la taille idéale de famille. Des mécanismes de ce 
type sont difficiles à représenter dans un modèle formel, et c’est pourquoi nous avons eu 
recours à un modèle de simulation multi-agents pour explorer le processus. Dans notre 
dispositif expérimental, un modèle de croissance et de population stable est calibré aux 
données suédoises, en utilisant la configuration suédoise de politique sociale. Le modèle 
est entraîné dans un piège de fécondité en élevant les coûts relatifs de l’enfant en lien 
avec la croissance positive. Dans ce cas, même des augmentations importantes des 
prestations familiales sont insuffisantes pour sortir du piège. Toutefois, le petit nombre 
d’enfants permet temporairement à l’économie de croître plus rapidement pendant 
quelques décennies. L’arrêt de l’adaptation aux normes sociales conduit à une 
neutralisation du piège. 
 
 
Mots-clés : Piège de basse fécondité, Normes sociales, Revenu relatif, Croissance 
économique 
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1. Introduction 
There is by now plenty of evidence that gross domestic product (GDP) growth across 
countries has a negative relation to fertility rates and dependency ratios. Kelley and 
Schmidt (2005) summarize much of the evidence concerning the importance of 
demographic factors for growth in both developing and developed countries. Lindh and 
Malmberg (2007) estimate a demographically based forecasting model which takes 
account of the changing economic impact of age distribution as longevity increases. The 
negative impact of large cohorts of children is a robust feature. In Barro-type cross-
country growth regressions, high fertility has also been established as a substantial 
negative factor. This is not really new, but provides confirmation, for example, of the 
shift-share analysis of Krueger (1968) who makes the point that a very large part of the 
difference in production levels between developing and developed countries can be 
explained by demography and education.1 
 
It is intuitively rather obvious that an economy where almost half of the population is 
below 15, as is the case in many African countries, has to carry a large burden of 
supporting and educating the young, a burden of which only a tiny fraction will appear 
as value-added in the national accounts. As emphasized by Bloom et al. (2003), the 
demographic dividend from falling fertility appears as the working population starts to 
grow faster than the dependent population. Mason and Lee (2007) stress the possibility 
of a second demographic dividend as middle-aged people start saving for retirement and 
thereby contribute to increasing capital resources. 
 
Because growth can be accelerated by lowering fertility it becomes theoretically 
possible to compensate for rising elderly dependency ratios by decreasing fertility. 
Indeed we observe that several developed countries both in Europe and Asia are 
experiencing very low fertility which is accelerating their aging. While only China has a 
deliberate one-child policy, fertility involuntarily seems to be lower than in China in 
both South Korea and Japan. Since below-replacement fertility will speed up population 
aging, this is ultimately not a sustainable equilibrium. Sooner or later the current 
financial support for the elderly provided by the economically active population will 
become insufficient. That may well take a long time though and in the meantime 
resources can be shifted from reproduction to support for the elderly.  
 
Recently it has been put forward, e.g. Lutz et al. (2006), that countries with very low 
fertility (below say 1.5) may be caught in a low fertility trap (the Low Fertility Trap 
Hypothesis, LFTH). This builds on the observation by inter alia McDonald (2005) that a 
recovery towards replacement levels seems to become increasingly difficult to achieve 
in countries with very low fertility. The mechanism suggested by Lutz et al. builds on 
three different feedbacks. One is the demographic inertia of a baby bust where the small 
cohorts will have fewer babies simply because there are fewer people of reproductive 
age. The second feedback is hypothesized to work through social norms which make 
fewer children more desirable as the prevalence of children in society becomes rarer. 
This social interaction and its effect on the ideal family size work as a negative 
                                                 
1
 Myrskylä et al. (2008) find a U-shaped relation between a Human Development Index and fertility. 
While an HDI weighs in GDP per capita as one factor, this is not the same as GDP growth.  
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feedback reinforcing low fertility standards. Thirdly, Lutz et al. add the socio-economic 
relative income effect of Easterlin (1961), where the aspired standard of living is 
determined by consumption standards in the parental home acting as a constraint on the 
number of desired children when it becomes harder to achieve these aspirations (also cf 
Macunovich 1998). Such social interaction mechanisms are hard to capture in a 
standard economic model framework. For this reason we propose to use an agent-based 
simulation model (ABM) to investigate the economic consequences of low fertility and 
its feedback on the fertility decision.  
 
We use a simple agent-based framework model as an experimental tool to investigate 
under what circumstances a low fertility trap may be likely to appear. The model is built 
around the tension between a long education interfering with the prime fertility period 
of females and the need for such education in order to satisfy consumption aspirations 
arising from the relative income effect.  
 
The crucial elements in an agent-based simulation model are the rules of thumb that 
agents use for making decisions. These rules can incorporate both an economic 
dimension and a social interaction dimension, both of which are important for the low 
fertility trap. Individual micro behavior results in a macro outcome which in turns feeds 
back into individual decisions, and hence a micro-macro interdependence is obtained 
which cannot be modeled in more traditional microsimulation models.  
 
By calibration to Swedish micro and macro data2 the simulation model offers an 
experimental laboratory to test different theoretical mechanisms and their implications 
for the balance between current benefits from low cohort fertility and the losses in terms 
of future shrinkage of the tax base and of growth potential. Thus our base scenario in 
this paper approximately reproduces the natural reproduction features of the Swedish 
population during the 20th century. 
 
We then experiment with alternative scenarios focused on the relative income 
mechanism in order to spring a low fertility trap. It turns out that introducing a 
mechanism that increases the relative cost of children versus consumption has the 
potential to set off a low fertility trap. The growth rate in GDP per capita increases 
substantially and for a long time before the elderly dependency burden makes the 
system fiscally unsustainable. It takes a very large benefit that is permanently increased 
to counteract this and even to delay the low fertility trap. The crucial element of the 
fertility trap turns out to be the social norms system. When the social norm mechanism 
is disabled the increase in relative costs of children does decrease fertility somewhat but 
does not provoke a fertility trap. 
 
For reasons of brevity, this paper does not go into detail about the model, and a more 
comprehensive description is available in Žamac et al. (2008). In the next section we 
first discuss the background and theoretical starting point more completely. This is 
followed by a short account of the model structure and the crucial mechanisms in the 
modeling context. In the third section, we analyze the results of alternative scenarios 
                                                 
2
 We have also used some data from the Swedish National Transfer Accounts . See Lee and Mason (2004) 
about National Transfer Accounts that track intergenerational flows in an economy. 
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and discuss the potential implications. Finally we conclude our argument by discussing 
how the results can be used to focus further work around growth and fertility. 
2. Background and theoretical starting point 
Negative momentum from low birth rates that decreases the future fertile population is 
an obvious demographic feedback from low fertility. Ideal family size as measured in 
attitude surveys shows a downward trend in many countries. Whereas ideal family size 
is still higher than actual total fertility rates (TFR) in Europe, there are some countries, 
e.g. Austria and Germany, where ideal family size is now well below replacement rates. 
There seems to be a downward trend of relative income in many industrialized countries 
(as far as it can be correctly measured) where it is claimed that the next generation will 
fare worse than their parents. All this seems to coincide with downward trends in cohort 
fertility and definitely with postponement of childbearing. But will these factors 
combine into a mutually reinforcing feedback circle as the LFTH suggests? There are 
three apparent escape routes to consider. First, extensive immigration may increase the 
fertile population and reverse the negative momentum. Second, ideological pressure 
could be mobilized to favor ideals of replacement fertility. Third, social policies can be 
implemented to relieve the relative income pressure. Our focus is on the third escape 
route, although it turns out that the second is more crucial for creating a trap. The first 
with immigration cannot be implemented in the current version of the model.  
 
The social policy frameworks differ substantially across the countries that are now 
experiencing negative fertility trends. It has been argued that the Scandinavian emphasis 
on policies favoring dual-earner families explains why the downward fertility trend is 
much less pronounced in these countries (Ferrarini 2003). The Swedish case is thus very 
relevant to study as a potential model that refutes the inevitability of the LFTH. Sweden 
has had a very stable cohort fertility rate (CFR), at around 2 for all cohorts born in the 
20th century where we can observe completed fertility, i.e. up to the early 1960s. The 
TFR, however, has fluctuated between 2.1 and 1.5 in the postwar period. Björklund 
(2006) thinks younger cohorts in Sweden will make up for the lag in their CFR, and 
indeed birth rates have been picking up and may be headed for a new baby boom. It 
nonetheless seems to be a fact that the relative income of young adults in Sweden has 
been falling over the same period. Norms regarding the desired family size have been 
very stable, at around 2 children, as measured in attitude surveys. At the same time the 
average age of the mother at first birth has risen steadily (24 years in 1970, 29 years in 
2005) substantially increasing the probability of not achieving desired fertility.  
 
Thus, one may hypothesize that family policy is a crucial factor interfering with the 
mechanisms of the LFTH, both by relieving or amplifying economic pressures and 
maybe also by a strong influence on social norms (or family policy designed to conform 
to social norms). However, as the South Korean and Japanese examples show, the 
design of pro-natalist social policies may be hard to implement efficiently in order to 
actually achieve any results.3  
                                                 
3
 The efficiency of social policies in increasing fert ility is still an open issue. While Feyrer et al. (2008), 
Björklund (2006) and others have estimated large effects there are other studies like OECD (2003) and 
Grant et al. (2004) which find that income-related policies have limited effects on fertility.  
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There is so far little consensus on whether the demographic transition will end up 
maintaining world population at approximately stable levels or will result in a future 
shrinking population. A generally accepted theory to generate predictions on fertility is 
missing today. The LFTH suggested by Lutz et al. (2006) offers a framework to 
structure further research around the micro-macro feedbacks. There are difficulties, 
however, since we cannot in general observe these feedbacks in isolation. We are 
dealing with very long-range processes taking place in a quickly changing social 
environment. Although OLG models following Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958) and 
Diamond (1965) have become a standard tool for economists analyzing 
intergenerational issues as well as general macroeconomics, it is still the case that these 
models quickly become intractable when the population structure is non-stationary. This 
has led to numerous attempts to use simulation in order to investigate their properties 
under more realistic assumptions (e.g. Kotlikoff et al. 2001). Increased realism, 
however, comes at the price of increasingly non-transparent calibration and assumptions 
that are not readily verifiable.  
 
Agent-based modeling offers an alternative where we can observe the aggregate effects 
of decentralized decision making without very strong assumptions on individual 
behavior and still maintain a degree of transparency and the opportunity to experiment 
with different mechanisms. Traditional microsimulation models building on estimated 
micro relations (Klevmarken 2002) have reached a point where severe problems have 
arisen concerning their ability to actually improve our understanding of behavioral 
mechanisms and their repercussions on the economy at large. Agent-based simulation 
modeling has recently been increasingly explored as a more flexible alternative focusing 
on actual behavior rather than the optimal behavior of individuals, in recognition of the 
fact that even if agents do behave rationally under their respective information sets, 
statistical methods will not allow us to evaluate the full heterogeneity of individual 
behavior (Richiardi et al. 2006). 
 
While the flexibility of ABM allows us to use the model as a laboratory to experiment 
over a wide range of issues, its drawback is that it easily tempts the researcher to do too 
much, to keep too many options open, to start playing a Sims computer game instead of 
investigating real issues. It is therefore of paramount importance to define the focus of 
each study rather narrowly. The basic model that we use has been developed at the 
Institute for Futures Studies using JAVA programming. The variant used in this paper is 
adapted to the specific issue of fertility and the mechanisms of the LFTH.  
 
In brief, it exploits the interaction of education choice, mating and the fertility decision 
to generate a self-propagating population embedded in an endogenous growth model. 
This base version of the model is adapted here to the low fertility issue by introducing a 
relative income mechanism. 
3. What Is Agent-Based Modeling? 
ABM starts from the premise that the "real world" is hardly the work of a central 
planner, built to conform to rational rules. Rather, the real world is characterized by 
decentralized, simultaneous interactions between a very large number of different 
agents, whose decision-making is based on limited rationality, imperfect information 
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and habits, and where the local relational context also contributes to those agents’ 
strategies and behaviors.  
 
There is a growing interest among economists in modeling micro-macro linkages 
between individual and aggregate level variables. Most recent attempts have consisted 
of combining economy-wide Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGE) with 
microsimulation models (see Davies 2004, for a review). They rely on the classical 
assumptions (e.g. rationality, perfect foresight, competitive markets, perfect 
information, market clearing, etc.), in order to find an optimal solution or "equilibrium" 
for aggregate level variables such as total output. CGE cannot account for heterogeneity 
across households, preferences or technologies; only a few types of representative 
agents are assigned the same production or utility functions. This is clearly a 
simplification which overlooks important variations at the micro level, and more 
generally makes distributional analysis unfeasible (i.e. how total output and 
consumption are actually distributed between different agents and what drives these 
differences).  
 
Microsimulation models on the other hand, are mostly used to study distributional 
effects e.g. of tax and benefit systems, at the micro level, including (in the case of 
dynamic microsimulation models) projections over the individual agent’s entire life 
cycle (including behavioral responses e.g. labor supply, fertility choice, education, etc). 
Usually built on household survey data (or other micro- level data), they allow access to 
detailed information e.g. about individuals’ income sources, areas of residence, past 
employment history etc., but they cannot deal with modeling the monetary side of the 
economy or with the inclusion of structural macro features and aggregate feedbacks, 
which therefore have to be assumed as exogenous.  
 
In practice, integrated macro-micro models are difficult to implement, mostly due to a 
tradeoff between adding model complexity and finding solutions which can be handled 
by standard computational tools. ABMs represent a further step in the development of 
dynamic macro-microsimulation modeling. They can incorporate modern computing 
developments (e.g. object-oriented programming languages) to simulate complex 
interactions simultaneously, and to simulate how these interactions evolve in time 
through the accumulation of new information, with no need to have two separate 
converging models (e.g. one micro and one macro), nor to have convergence to an 
equilibrium solution at all.  
 
The principle behind ABMs is that of multiple interacting agents who are goal directed 
(e.g. preserving a certain aspired consumption level in our case), and who try to control 
their environment, in a decentralized (i.e. non-coordinated, non-centrally planned) 
system. ABMs do not assume rationality or the existence of a pre-defined equilibrium 
outcome. Agents might behave in sub-optimal ways, but they can gradually learn from 
their experiences and adjust their behavior to the neighboring environment.  
 
The first attempt to apply ABM to the social sciences is considered to be T. Schelling’s 
"Models of segregation" (Schelling 1969). Using JAVA or similar object-oriented 
programming languages, ABM agents are usually implemented in software as objects 
i.e. computational entities that have initial states (e.g. sex, age), are able to perform 
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some pre-specified action or method, can communicate or share information with 
others, pass on or even inherit characteristics or behavioral rules.  
 
Running an ABM simply means instantiating an agent population, and letting it run 
forward in time, i.e. executing it, rather than solving it. The outcomes of agents’ 
interactions can be observed at any given time by the modeler who only needs to 
specify some initial behavioral algorithms (the equivalent of classical preferences) and 
initial conditions for his agents and their environment. These agents or objects can 
represent people (say consumers, sellers, or voters), but they can also represent social 
groupings such as families, firms, communities, government agencies and nations.  
 
In our application we view the model as an experimental laboratory for testing 
mechanisms in a more complex setting than analytical modeling, allowing yet more 
transparency, and subject to experimental control. This makes inference possible 
regarding causal mechanisms that cannot be gleaned from econometric estimation on 
real world data. This does not replace other modes of analysis but is a complement for 
testing the logic of economic mechanisms in a more complex setting that can, to some 
extent, be validated against real world data.  
4. The IFSIM model 
The IFSIM model, as we call it, consists of a small number of interacting modules. Due 
to space considerations we only give a brief overview of some features that are 
important for this paper. 
4.1. Demographic module 
The starting population comes directly from the initial dataset.4 There is no migration in 
the model so the population evolves according to fertility and mortality rates. Since we 
focus on the fertility decision, the mortality rates are exogenously set in line with the 
Swedish rates in 2006. The maximum age an individual can reach is 110.  
 
Before a woman can give birth she needs to find a partner and move out of her parental 
home. Starting from age 18, individuals living with their parents may start to leave the 
parental household and set up a household of their own. The decision to leave home is 
modeled as an exponential probability function depending on age and on the share of 
youngsters living with their mother within the network. We check that leaving home 
and mating occurs at relatively early ages so that it does not impose a restriction on 
fertility. By the age of 21 every individual has left the parental household.  
  
The mating process is assortative such that pairs with similar human capital and 
belonging to the same network are more likely to create a new married household.  
                                                 
4
 The data comes from the Swedish micro data set HUS (See Klevmarken and Olovsson 1993 and Flood 
et al. 1996), which is a representative sample of about 3000 individuals which we scale to obtain our 
desired number of indiv iduals in the init ial year of simulat ion. In the first period of the model we also 
introduce some init ial aggregate variables  (like, e .g., mortality rates) from Statistics Sweden. 
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4.1.1. Fertility 
There are several variables that affect the fertility outcome. First we have fecundity, 
which is beyond individual control. We roughly capture this biological res triction by 
calibrating the probability of conceiving to medical studies. This yields a fast declining 
probability from age 30 onward. The upper limit for conceiving is set to age 40 since 
only few births are recorded in Swedish data after that. We also have a lower starting 
age set to 20 below which it is not possible to give birth. There are few teenage 
pregnancies in Sweden today.  
Second, we model a fertility function that allows us to capture the main elements of the 
LFTH. The LFTH has a social dimension and an economic dimension. The social 
dimension refers to how our desire to acquire children is influenced by the number of 
children around us. We first start by assuming that the norm of how many children one 
wants is set during youth. We call this the desired number of children. Every individual 
has a desired number of children that is determined by the number of siblings that 
he/she has. For the couple, we use the average of the man's and the woman's desired 
number of children, weighted with a random number. The couple strives to reach its 
desired number, but, due to their economic outcome and the social influence of their 
network group, it is not sure that they will reach this target. Given that the woman is of 
fertile age and that the number of desired children is higher than the actual number, she 
will give birth if the two following conditions hold: 
,incomemedian
rn
DISP

 
,* 10 ASPCPROJCorSocialFact  
where DISP is the disposable household income, n is the number of individuals in the 
household and r is the cost of a new child. In the baseline scenario we fix this cost r to 
1. However, in the alternative scenarios, when we simulate an increase in the cost of 
having a new child, we model this by increasing r. The square root captures the 
economies of scale of large families. The first condition says that the household's 
equivalent income (adjusted to include one extra child) must exceed the median 
individual income, which implies that today’s economic conditions are very important 
in the fertility choice. The median income is considered as a sort of “minimum” income 
for affording a child. 
The second condition says that the social factor in combination with expected future 
income, PROJC10, must exceed the aspired consumption level, denoted ASPC. We 
define the social factor according to:   
 MembersKids
MembersKids
NN
NN
e
e
orSocialFact
/
/
1
 
 
where KidsN  is the number of children belonging to the MembersN  members in the network 
group. Here  is a parameter that controls the strength of social pressure, currently set 
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to 0.92. If many individuals within a couple's network have children this will positively 
affect the couple's fertility decision.   
 
The economic dimension consists of determining if the couple can afford a new child or 
not in the future given their consumption aspirations. We follow the LFTH and state 
that a couple aspires to a certain consumption level based on their previous experience. 
They will not acquire a child unless they can reach this aspired consumption level. As 
postulated by Easterlin, this aspired consumption level is a norm that is formed during 
youth and which has the consumption level of the home of origin as the reference point. 
We model this aspired consumption, ASPC, according to: 
 
CASPC , 
 
where  nDISPC /  is the average equivalent disposable income today and 
   10101010 )1( PROJCCCC atatat  . C is the equivalent disposable income for 
an individual in the household. The subscript at10 indicates that the aspirations were set 
when the individual was 10 years old. The first term states that the position in the 
consumption distribution at the age of 10 affects the aspired consumption level. The 
idea is that children should not obtain a worse position in the consumption distribution. 
The second factor captures the idea that parents do not want their children to have a 
lower consumption level than they themselves had when young, adjusted for economic 
growth. We also apply a weighting factor, )1,0( , currently set at 0.5, for the two 
different reference points for aspired consumption. Since the reference point was set 
when the parents were 10 years old it is natural to compare the new child’s consumption 
level at the age of 10. For this reason they project expected future income according to:  
 
 
rn
DISP
PROJC

10
10 , 
 
Where 10DISP  is the disposable income ten years from today if they choose to have one 
additional child.  The household’s disposable income ten years into the future is 
estimated from the sample of individuals in the model that today have ten more years of 
labor market experience. As mentioned earlier, in the base scenario, r is equal to unity, 
but varies between 1 and 3 in alternative scenarios, depending on economic growth in 
society.  
 
Once a child is born, the mother is on parental leave for three years before returning to 
her previous labor market status. This exaggerates the actual Swedish paid parental 
leave (today  it is 13 months at maximum), but is a way to avoid complications in taking 
into account other benefits, such as the right to part-time work until the child is 8 years 
old and the right to paid leave to care for sick children up to age 12. Doing a sensitivity 
analysis with parental leave reduced to just one year results in only a minor tendency for 
higher fertility but the dynamic behavior of the model remains very close to what we 
present below. 
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4.2. Social networks 
Newborn individuals inherit some of their parents’ characteristics. From birth they will 
belong to a network group, the first one being determined by their parents’ 
characteristics. The networks are segmented first by age groups and second, within each 
age group, by a spatial dimension. A network group consists of all those individuals to 
whom the individual is close. We follow Billari et al. (2006) in defining social 
“closeness” as a spatial area representing the individual’s scope of interaction, by age 
group. Specifically, agents are arranged along the surface of an imaginary cylinder, 
whose height is subdivided into as many segments as there are age groups in the model 
(at present there are 8 age groups, from age 0 to 110). Individuals will migrate between 
network groups as they age, and two individuals that belong to the same network group 
at one age may belong to different groups at later ages.  
 
4.3. Educational module 
When reaching the age of 7, all individuals are universally enrolled in basic schooling 
until the age of 16, corresponding to 9 years of compulsory education. If they enter high 
school, they will stay in school another 3 years. The choice to apply to university is 
determined by individuals’ prospective earnings compared to their aspired consumption 
level, and preferred number of children. If secondary education is enough to reach the 
same per capita equivalent income as their parents, given the preferred number of 
children, they will not apply for university. Hence, the educational choice does not 
depend directly on fertility choices. However, it does so indirectly since if individuals 
estimate that they can reach their aspired consumption level given their preferred 
number of children without having to invest in education, then they will not choose 
university. 
   
The university applicants are ranked according to accumulated human capital (see 
below) such that the ones with the highest human capital are actually accepted by the 
university. The number of available positions at the university is set to a fixed 
proportion of the current number of individuals aged 19 to 30. If attending university, 
the student will be entitled to a student allowance for the duration of the course (5 
years), amounting to a fixed proportion of average earnings.  
4.4. Modules for human capital formation, the labor 
market and production of consumption goods 
We postulate a production technology that only depends on human capital (i.e. there are 
no savings into other types of productive assets). Production depends on low-skilled and 
high-skilled workers according to: 
HL
tHtLt HHQ ,,  
where 1 HL , and tLH ,  and tHH ,  are the aggregate human capital for the non-
university and university degree groups, respectively. There are no monetary values in 
the model so earnings are represented by the share of total production output going to 
each worker. Allocation of the produced goods to workers is separated into two steps. 
First, the total produced goods are allocated to the two production factors (non-
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university and university degree individuals) such that the shares reflect each group’s 
marginal product. Then, within each group, the consumption good units are allocated 
proportionally to the human capital of the individual. If the supply of university degree 
individuals is reduced, their marginal product will increase and thereby increase their 
share of the produced goods. As a result, the education premium also increases. This 
will be observed by young individuals who will be more likely to choose university and 
thus increase the future supply of university degree individuals.  
As human capital is of paramount importance in the model, we will describe in detail 
how it is modeled. There are four main inputs that determine the human capital of each 
individual: (i) innate individual ability; (ii) ability acquired from parental influence and 
parental own human capital levels; (iii) ability acquired through formal education; (iv) 
skills and expertise acquired through training on the job.  
At birth, an individual is immediately assigned a native human capital stock which 
captures the average native human capital stock of the parents (i.e. a purely genetically 
inherited feature) plus a random number. Subsequently, from the first year of life, 
human capital evolves every year depending on events during the year. We allow for 
three different functions for human capital updating depending on which life phase the 
individual is in. The three phases that we consider are: pre-school, in-school, and post-
school.  
4.4.1. Pre-school 
Consider an individual with innate human capital 0ih . The discrete time evolution of the 
human capital in the pre-school phase is modeled as  
  parents
fm
own
titiitit hhhh  1  
where  indicates first differences and ith is the human capital of individual i in period t. 
m fi i
h h  denote the human capital of individual i ’s mother and father in period t. How 
the two input factors, the sum of parents’ human capital and the child’s own capital, are 
combined is determined by the parameters own  and parents which are specific to the 
pre-school period and set exogenously.  
4.4.2. In-school 
During schooling a third input factor affects the production of human capital, namely 
the ratio between the aggregate level of human capital among the teachers and the 
number of students. Since teachers are randomly drawn from the labor force there will 
be a spillover effect when the overall human capital increases. However, the teacher-
student ratio is also important so we account for the number of students. To formalize, 
the human capital production during school periods is defined as:  
   
s
teach
s
parents
fm
s
own
t
teach
ttitiitit studHhhhh /1   
 12 
where the superscript s  indicates that the parameter value depends on the level of 
education (primary, secondary, and tertiary), and s
teach
indicates how the new input 
factor is combined. teach
tH and tstud denote aggregate teacher human capital and number 
of students, respectively. The policy makers can thus directly influence the production 
of human capital by allocating more resources to the educational sector (employing 
more teachers). The ratio of teachers per student is fixed at 0.1.  
4.4.3. Post-school 
In standard wage equations, labor market experience approximates human capital 
production at work. In our setup, we can use a pure “at-work” human capital production 
function similar to the in-school production function. The human capital increases for 
every work year but proportionately less for each additional year up to age 55. We 
extend the production function to incorporate a deterioration of human capital in periods 
of parental leave. Formally, the human capital production at work is :  
  
1
55
10
it
it k it
age
h edu h

 
where eduk is a factor that is dependent on the level of education: basic, secondary, and 
university. The rate of increase accelerates as level of education rises, thus generating 
steeper wage profiles over life for the higher educated. During periods out of the labor 
market, notably on parental leave, the human capital is set to depreciate at a yearly rate 
of 0.015.  
4.5. State, tax and benefit systems 
Beside individual agents, the model includes an institutional object acting as an agent 
that represents “the State” who collects and redistributes resources. First, the State 
calculates the total expenditure bill, by aggregating the costs of the education, teacher 
salaries and student allowances, parental leave subsidies, child allowances and 
pensions.5 Once total expenditures are calculated, the State will adapt the tax system so 
as to raise sufficient revenues to balance the budget (no debt is allowed). The tax system 
comprises a state tax and a local tax. The state tax is paid by the top 20 percent of the 
income distribution and amounts to 20 percent. The local tax paid by everybody with 
positive earnings is a flat-rate tax on earnings. It is residually derived to cover the part 
of total expenditure not covered by the state tax. The individual income tax will 
therefore be a combination of the state tax (if eligible) and the local tax. The individual 
disposable income is therefore the sum of any earnings, pensions, student or parental 
allowances, minus the income tax.  
5. Model scenarios 
Given the basic model setup above, both the demographic and the social norm 
mechanisms are included. The relative income mechanism has been implemented by 
defining an aspired consumption level based on the household income in the parental 
                                                 
5
 The pension system is modelled according to the new Swedish pension system except that we have a 
fixed ret irement age at 65 and we do not have any funded part. We only model the pay -as-you-go 
component which in reality comprises about 87 percent of the total public coverage . 
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home at 10 years of age. See Žamac et al. (2008) for more details. For a fertility 
decision to take place, a match must first have been achieved with a partner in the local 
network. In the next step a decision is taken whether to have a child. First it is 
determined whether a child can be afforded at the current income level. If so, and if 
future income expectations allow a new child, then procreation is initiated. This is the 
base scenario which we then subject to a cost shock in order to provoke a fertility trap.  
5.1. Base scenario 
In the base scenario the simulation runs for more than 300 years. The influence of initial 
conditions takes about 100 years to vanish. An initialization period of 150 years is 
therefore disregarded in the analysis. After this period the model stabilizes and roughly 
reproduces 20th century demographic behavior in Sweden.  
 
Poor economic circumstances at fertile ages with respect to the aspired income make 
potential parents postpone childbearing, in hope of better economic conditions in the 
future. As the returns of education increase with education level, highly educated 
parents increase their chance of getting their preferred number of children. On the other 
hand, education takes valuable time from their fertile years. Since fecundity decreases 
with age, this increases the risk of not reaching the desired number of children.  
 
Below we briefly present some main features of the base scenario. In Figure 1 we depict 
the population development in the last 160 years of the simulation (for convenience we 
label model years starting from the year 0 but note that this is arbitrary). There are 
short-term periods of positive and negative growth, but the long-term trend is positive 
population growth. Over the study period there is an increase from about 11,000 to 
15,000 inhabitants.  
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Figure 1 Population development in base scenario  
 
The age composition of the population is very stable over time; see Figure 2 below, 
which shows the shares of young (0-20), prime-aged (20-64), retired (65+) and oldest-
old (80+) by model year. There is an oscillatory pattern (suggesting a saw-toothed age 
distribution) that reflects influential baby boom cohorts and which, to some extent, 
actually resembles the Swedish demography over the 20th century. In the 65+ group 
these oscillations cancel out.  
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Figure 2 Age structure in the base scenario 
 
There is variation in the CFR over time that explains this pattern. For the whole period 
CFR is on average above replacement level at 2.15 children per woman. We observe a 
rather steady pattern but there are some temporary swings in CFR, as shown in Figure 3. 
We do not have any mechanism that leads to intensified efforts to procreate as fecundity 
declines. Intuitively there is no “biological clock” that makes individuals try to catch up 
in their 30s. Therefore the swings in period fertility due to changing economic 
conditions mostly carry over to cohort fertility. 
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Figure 3 Completed fertility, by birth cohort 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the age of the mother in general increases with education. 
Mothers are on average about 27 years old when they have their first child if they have 
only high school or basic education, while mothers with a university degree are on 
average about 29 when they have their first child.  
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Table 1 Average age of mothers when giving birth in the base scenario, by birth 
order of child and education level 
Birth order of child Basic+High school University Total 
    
1st 27.4 29.0 28.1 
2nd 30.3 31.2 30.7 
3rd 33.2 33.9 33.5 
4th 34.9 35.5 35.2 
5th 36.2 36.6 36.4 
6th 36.8 37.4 37.1 
    
Total 30.7 31.7 31.2 
 
Note that university studies are spread over a rather long period in young adulthood as 
some actually enter at a late age. The typical age at university graduation is 24 (i.e. the 
youngest possible graduation age), but the rest, about 17 percent, graduate between ages 
25-40. These delays in achieving a diploma will push child birth later into the fertile 
period. There is, however, a small chance that students will have a baby during 
education enrolment. Such events will delay university graduation even further for 
female students (by three years per baby). The larger effect on the high educated may 
reflect the increased difficulty of combining education and children. At the aggregate 
level, the base scenario data show that rising enrolment rates in higher education are 
linked to lower birth rates. Once enrolment rates drop, individuals obtain their diploma, 
and birth rates increase.  
 
The development of earnings over time, presented for the years 60-125 in Figure 4, 
shows strong period effects. These are due to a shortage of one education class relative 
to the other, creating a wage drift upwards for the scarce education category. In 
comparison, most of the period effects are not reflected in the human capital stock, 
shown in Figure 5 for the same period. The ratio of earnings to human capital hence 
fluctuates over time.  
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Figure 4 Earnings in model time 60-125 by education, base scenario 
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Figure 5 Human capital development, model time 60-125 by education, base 
scenario 
 
5.2. Alternative scenarios with a higher child cost  
In three alternative scenarios we modified the function that determines the cost of 
children in order to provoke a fertility trap. In the base scenario, the expected cost of 
having a new child is a fixed share of current median income. In the alternative 
scenarios, when the economy grows faster than usual there will be a relative price shift 
making children costlier in terms of consumption. This will force parents to invest a 
higher share of their income in the child, if they decide to have one. One rationalization 
for this upward drift in the relative cost of children is that the opportunity cost of 
parental time is increasing. Since everybody works full time in our model we cannot 
implement that mechanism directly through labor supply.  
 
Below we describe the three scenarios.  
1. No policy: our first alternative scenario, nothing is done to counteract the 
change in cost of children.  
2.  Increasing benefits : the second alternative scenario implements a child benefit 
immediately. In this scenario, the benefit is given by 
1 10.1 /t it tib W n 
%  where 
1itW  is the wage earnings for person i, 1tn  is the number of children eligible for 
the benefit in the population, both measured in the previous period. In a situation 
where few children are born, the benefit tb
~
 will rise to counteract the upward 
drift in the relative cost of children.  
3. Fixed social norms: this is the same as the “no policy” scenario 1 except that 
the social norm mechanism for adapting to the local network and siblings is 
turned off. 
  
In sum, alternative 1 lets the cost shock have full impact on behavior, while alternative 
2 implements active policies immediately. Alternative 3 includes no economic policy 
responses but prevent social norms from adapting and thus cuts out one element of 
negative feedback.  
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The relative cost shock mechanism is introduced into the model year 60.6 This is also 
the year when the social norm mechanism is turned off in the third scenario. One can 
clearly see that fertility is affected by the introduction of the changed child cost. In the 
no policy scenario, and with some delay also in the increasing benefits scenario, 
population actually declines at a fast rate (Figure 6) while population in the fixed social 
norms case still grows but more slowly. As is obvious in Figure 7, the CFR declines and 
two decades after the introduction of the relative cost mechanism the CFR only rarely 
exceeds replacement level. Increasing benefits are successful in blocking the drop in 
fertility about 40 years into the future, but this policy cannot turn the tide as fertility 
rates fall to low levels below 1.5. 
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Figure 6 Population in the base and alternative scenarios 
 
The relative size of the working-age population age 20-64 initially increases in all 
alternative scenarios (Figure 8). This gives rise to boosted GDP growth and lower taxes 
since less spending is needed in the educational system. But eventually the lowest- low 
fertility scenarios enter into a phase with a decreasing active population. 
 
                                                 
6
 All alternative scenarios are programmed in such a way that perfect replication of the base scenario is 
attained, up to a point when a change of arbitrary choice (like the change in child cost) is brought into 
play. This means that the initial random components in the model are exactly identical in all scenarios. 
Thus the alternatives can be interpreted as counter-factual to the base scenario. 
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Figure 7 Completed cohort fertility rate (CFR) in base and alternative scenarios, 
by model time  
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Figure 8 Share of working ages (20-64) relative to total population 
 
 
In the period before the child cost change occurs, mothers are about 28-29 years old 
when they have their first child, see upper part of Table 2. When the change is 
introduced in the model, births are postponed in all alternative scenarios. As time goes 
by, the fixed norm scenario stabilizes the year at first birth while in the other two it 
keeps on increasing. This is because aspired income is more difficult to reach with the 
same number of children as before. As a consequence, women postpone births to an 
extent that finally lowers the desired number of children and leads to decreasing fertility 
in both the no policy and increasing benefit scenarios.  
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Table 2 Average age of mothers at first birth in the base scenario compared to the 
different alternative scenarios, by model time 
Model year Base No policy Increasing 
benefits 
Fixed norms 
     
0-9 29.2 29.2 29.2 29.2 
10-19 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 
20-29 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 
30-39 28.5 28.5 28.5 28.5 
40-49 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 
50-59 28.1 28.1 28.1 28.1 
60-69 (decade of change) 28.2 30.2 28.6 29.5 
70-79 28.1 30.4 30.4 29.7 
80-89 27.7 30.8 31.2 29.7 
90-99 28.6 32.4 32.0 31.1 
100-109 27.9 32.2 32.6 30.9 
110-119 27.5 33.0 32.9 30.6 
 
In Figure 9 the share of high skilled in the working population suggests that the human 
capital stock per capita grows faster in both the no policy and increasing benefits 
scenarios than in the base scenario. This is a self-enforcing process. Once education has 
started to increase, the increase is sustained by a higher level of human capital in the 
economy making education more efficient. Agents also need more education in order to 
reach an aspired consumption level which is increasing likewise. This also contributes 
to further postponement of births.  
 
Last, the growth of the economy in the scenarios, depicted as per capita GDP and shown 
in Figure 10, exhibits the expected pattern. The alternatives with lower fertility at first 
allow much faster growth. As mentioned, the relative cost mechanism is set off by the 
GDP growth. High GDP growth scenarios therefore create a self-generating process of 
high child costs, further reducing fertility. The high per capita growth compared to the 
base scenario lasts in the increasing benefits case for almost 100 years (but note that 
GDP does not grow for that long in overall terms, due to shrinking population). This 
raises the issue of how far into the future the altruism of the current generations will 
persist. By remaining childless they can improve their material well-being but only at 
the expense of as yet unborn generations in the future.  
 
Figure 11 depicts the increase in tax rates as per capita growth declines. Tax ratios in 
the no policy case quickly increase to a hundred percent of GDP. 7 The increasing 
benefit scenario, which temporarily stops the drop in fertility, implies a very high cost 
requiring higher tax rates  – 10 percent or more – in all future periods. Implementing 
this policy would hardly be politically possible unless median voters had a very high 
degree of altruism towards future generations. In the end, however, high tax increases 
                                                 
7
 This is possible since we have no labor supply choice and people do not die of starvation when their 
income is confiscated. Also note that the taxes are redistributed. In practice the 100 percent tax rate 
should be interpreted as the collapse of the system.  
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like these also fail to prevent fiscally unsustainable tax levels, so tax hikes to provide 
high child benefits are not sufficient in themselves to reverse the trap. Introducing 
saving and capital investment might change this conclusion (see Mason and Lee, 2007, 
about the second demographic dividend) but its implementation in the model would 
substantially shift the focus of the study. 
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Figure 9 Proportion of high skilled (university educated) in the age group 20-64 
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Figure 10 GDP per capita in thousands 
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Figure 11 Tax revenues per GDP (“tax-ratio”) 
5.2.1. Importance of social factors  
How much of the fertility trap that we have created is a result of economic feedback 
from the parental home while growing up and how much is a result of the gradual 
formation of social norms? In our model the main role is clearly played by social norms.  
 
In contrast to the increasing benefit scenario, there is no dramatic population decline in 
the fixed norm scenario, but instead a mild increase, although smaller than in the base 
scenario. Cohort fertility is a little lower than the base but still above replacement levels. 
As could be seen from the previous figures, this scenario also bears a close resemblance 
to the base scenario in its other dimensions, such as age dependency ratios, per capita 
GDP growth and tax rates. Although a new child will be viewed as more expensive, this 
affects outcomes more like an idiosyncratic disturbance that can be adapted to. It seems 
thus that the social norms as we have modeled them have a major impact on 
development, reinforcing small imbalances and continually allowing them to spread 
both through the population and over time. The economic mechanisms, on the other 
hand, allow the agents to adapt in order to reach their desired number of children. Thus 
the adaptation of social norms is the key to creating a fertility trap. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our simulation model is capable of reproducing a fertility trap without crashing or 
exhibiting unexpected behavior, such as overly strong reactions to alternative policies, 
over a secular period of time. The increasing benefit scenario shows that, compared to 
doing nothing, getting out of the trap requires very determined and persistent policy 
measures with high temporary growth costs. Temporary in this context implies a period 
longer than the expected remaining life time of the currently active population. Even so, 
our experiments indicate that in the long run benefits will have to increase even further 
than the policy we implement. Once downturns in fertility start the social norm 
mechanism, the system quickly gets into a negative spiral where new policies cannot be 
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financed. Without a fair degree of altruism such measures would not be politically 
feasible anyway. Selfish individuals without consideration for their descendants far into 
the future would delay action until recovery is impossible because the tax base has 
grown too weak to support the necessary transfers.  
 
Removing the social norm dynamics is, in itself, sufficient to avoid getting trapped into 
low fertility; the economic mechanisms can adjust to restore balance in spite of the 
disturbances. It is the social norm dynamics which entrench new, ultimately 
unsustainable, behavior in the population. 
 
Of course, our conclusions are only strictly valid for our virtual world. In the real world 
there is a lot more scope for adaptation. Our virtual world is, however, reasonably 
complex and still reproduces features of demographic dynamics in Sweden that we had 
not expected to model originally. Nor had we expected the results we found. We 
therefore conclude from this study the following. 
 
1. Within an isolated system of intergenerational transfers where relative costs of 
children are increasing a low fertility trap can form.  
2. When this process has been entrenched in social norms it is very costly, and may 
ultimately be impossible, to reverse the trend. 
3. Unless voters are fairly altruistic this will not be politically feasible in a 
democracy. 
4. Dissolution of the social norm mechanism seems the most important policy to 
pursue. 
 
An obvious question is whether there is a policy that can actually achieve dissolution of 
strong social norms. Increasing social mobility via increased income redistribution 
might not be efficient, but in our model framework it would be a step in the right 
direction. More likely to meet with success is a more proactive policy that prevents 
fertility rates from falling to levels where the social norms become entrenched. Given 
the failure of proactive policy information on future consequences for society, 
immigration and tax policies more directly tailored to compensating for the rising 
relative costs of children might be effective in a real-world setting. Future empirical 
research should pay more attention to measuring the relative costs of children and 
whether variation in this variable can be causally tied to actual fertility behavior.  
 
In simulations it is important to test whether a savings mechanism would modify the 
conclusions. There are a number of reasons why capital markets may circumvent the set 
of vicious circles we have set in motion in our virtual world. First, capital investment 
may to some extent substitute labor. Second, the “second demographic dividend” of net 
saving for old age may circumvent the aspired income mechanism by providing 
sufficient returns to ensure that aspired consumption levels are achieved without 
foregoing either education or children. Third, a capital market would allow public 
borrowing to invest in children without further diminishing the current income available 
for consumption. Other extensions could be to introduce migration and ethnic barriers in 
the networks. 
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